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I. INTRODUCTION
Following the Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995, the slogan, “think globally, 
act locally,” became spotlighted all over the world.  This slogan appears to represent or 
symbolize the current epistemological and practical tasks for the women’s movement; 
however, there seem to be many ways to interpret these words corresponding to each 
person’s and community’s perspective.  “Think global, act local” is not only enigmatic, 
but also ambiguous and, at the same time, constant; it may also be abstract, and concrete. 
In this sense, this slogan seems to be “an object” able to travel across borders where it 
may be understood differently in different places, and at the same time maintain some 
sort of constant identity (Bowker and Star 1999).  Therefore, examining the implication 
of this slogan can be similar to exploring the current situation of the global women’s 
movement.  Furthermore, this slogan can be considered a pathway for articulating a 
genealogy of the international women’s movement of the past decades, because it was 
coined as a result of the progress women’s movements have made through their 
cooperation at four United Nations (UN) world conferences on women. 
Therefore, I will explore the historical shifts of the UN world conferences on 
women, raising the question as to what is at stake in thinking globally and acting locally.
My examination will start from an analysis of the contents and processes of the UN 
conferences, and then attempt to articulate the implication of thinking globally and acting 
locally to figure out the current tasks for the transnational women’s movement,1 and 
1 I will use the term, transnational women’s movement, to point to the tendency beyond 
the movements based on nation-states.  Transnationalism, internationalism, and 
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especially for the Korean women’s movement.  In spite of the importance of these 
conferences, there are too few reviews of and scholarly responses to the UN conferences 
on women.  In addition, the contents of each conference are usually examined separately, 
so it is very hard to catch the historical process of the women’s movement within these 
conferences.  Another problem is that practical issues and academic epistemological 
concerns seem to be separated from each other in exploring these conferences.  As a 
result, there is, on the one hand, a positive evaluation of the conferences and, on the other 
hand, a disappointment with what the conferences have achieved.  Thus, I will attempt 
to review the conferences with consideration of the historical and epistemological shifts 
simultaneously, while connecting academic feminist concerns with practical issues--that 
is, figuring out how and why the main issues of each conference have changed and how 
academic feminist theory and feminism in practice have interrelated with each other. In 
this way, I believe we can evaluate the results of the conferences more properly and come 
to some conclusions about where we have finally arrived after two decades of struggling 
through four UN women’s conferences, what was accomplished, and what remains to be 
done both at the level of discourse and practice.   
My research will focus on four questions: 
1) How have the main issues shifted from the first conference to the final one?  Can we 
figure out the linkage between the practical issues and epistemic discourses during this 
process?  2) What kinds of power dynamics have been working in the global arena in 
terms of transnational feminism?  In what context could the diverse women’s groups 
globalization often are used interchangeably, but strictly considered, they have slightly 
different meanings.  According to Amrita Basu’s definition, “transnationalism points to 
relationships among advocacy groups, networks, and movements within civil society and 
doesn’t privilege the role of states” (Aidoo, Acosta-Belen, Basu, Conde, Painter, and 
Saadawi 2000, 4).
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succeed in negotiating and producing a consensus?  How should we evaluate the 
consensus and declarations of these conferences?  3) What is at stake in “thinking
globally” and what should we do to “act locally”?  Does this slogan still represent 
current objectives of the women’s movement, or does the growth of transnational social 
movements imply that this is the time to “replace the bumper sticker…or simply to retire 
the bumper sticker” (Basu 2000, 68)?  How should we interpret this implication?  4) 
How has the Korean women’s movement interacted with this international process?  In 
the Korean context, what should we do to “think globally, act locally” as feminists 
pursuing equality and, at the same time, concerned to identify concrete measures for the 
next steps? 
There have been many conflicts at these conferences, especially around the 
significant material issues dividing women between South and North, and East and West, 
and that are embedded in quite different theoretical perspectives concerning gender and 
women, difference and solidarity, and women’s human rights.  Yet, women have been 
able to “inhabit the world with others” and “move beyond the opposition between 
common and uncommon, between friends and strangers, [and] between sameness and 
difference” (Ahmed 2000, 180).  From women to gender, beyond differences to 
solidarity, against either universalism2 or cultural relativism, women in the world have 
brought about a new consciousness in the name of transnational feminism. They have 
trained themselves in the international policymaking process as “global agents” and been 
able to bring a new understanding of egalitarian gender relations to international debates.  
2 In this case, I use “universalism” to point out the tendency of homogenization.  Thus, 
in my usage, “universality of rights” is a different concept from universalism.  The term, 
“universality,” was one of the hotly debated terms at the Beijing conference and is also 
deeply related to the discourse on the women’s human rights.
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In looking at the Korean women’s agenda for empowerment alongside an examination of 
the UN conferences on women, I hypothesize that the Korean “local” is closely related to 
the accomplishments of these UN “global” conferences.  This paper therefore concludes 
with a focus on Korea, with the expectation that the goals of the Korean women’s 
movement can be more clearly articulated within a study that views the local alongside 
the global. 
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II. THE UNITED NATIONS WORLD CONFERENCES ON WOMEN
By the time the first UN conference was held in Mexico City in 1975, there was already a 
tradition of internationalism among women activists. The history of women’s 
international movements can be traced back to at least the early nineteenth century. 
Bonnie S. Anderson, in Joyous Greetings: The First International Women’s Movement, 
1830-1860 (2000), described an 1851 letter, written by two jailed French feminists asking 
for international support, that encouraged her to research this topic: “The more I 
investigated, the more international connections I discovered” (1).  In Worlds of Women: 
The Making of an International Movement (1997), Leila J. Rupp identified women who 
organized across national borders from the late nineteenth century to the 1950s, formed 
diverse groups, and shaped new transnational organizations.  Following the first 
international women’s congress that convened in Paris in 1877, national sections for 
international women’s organizations such as the International Council of Women 
(founded in 1888), the International Alliance of Women (founded in 1904), and the 
Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (founded in 1915) were formed in 
more than fifty countries all around the world.  In 1946, several women who served on 
UN General Assembly (GA) delegations met privately, drafted and signed an “Open 
Letter to the Women of the World,” and in 1947 were successful in having a Commission 
on the Status on Women (CSW) authorized by the UN’s Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC).  Margaret E. Galey (1995) maintains that the CSW has had a significant 
influence on UN bodies and that this is due to its connection with international women’s 
organizations.  While all official UN conferences, from the Rio conference in 1992, have 
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been accompanied by separate UN-authorized Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) 
Forums, women’s conferences, thanks to the enthusiastic participation of international 
women’s organizations in the work of the CSW, have had an even longer history of an 
NGO presence.
Women’s tradition of internationalism finally culminated with UN world 
conferences.3  Four world conferences took place between 1975 and 1995: in Mexico 
City in 1975, Copenhagen in 1980, Nairobi in 1985, and Beijing in 1995.  In addition to 
the world conferences on women, there have been several other UN global forums since 
1990 that produced separate sections devoted to women in their final documents: the 
Conference on Environment and Development (1992, Rio de Janeiro), the World 
Conference on Human Rights (1993, Vienna), the International Conference on Population 
and Development (1994, Cairo), and the World Summit on Social Development (1995, 
Copenhagen).4  Women’s groups actively participated in these conferences and had a 
positive effect on the processes, results and resolutions (Charlesworth 1996; Bunch 1995). 
Exploring how the key issues and perspectives dealt with in each conference 
changed can provide us with a valuable chance for reviewing the tasks of the current 
transnational women’s movement.  The theme of all four of the UN conferences on 
women, “Equality, Development, and Peace,”5 first pronounced at the conference in 
3 The call for a UN women’s conference dates back to 1946.  In the preparation meeting 
prior to the establishment of the CSW at the end of April 1946 in New York, seven of 
nine sub-commission members set four immediate tasks; one of them was “a women’s 
conference” (Galey 1995).
4 The Rio Conference Program for Action contains a whole chapter entitled “Global 
Action for Women towards Sustainable and Equitable Development.”  The Vienna 
Declaration and Program of Action on Human Rights contain a section on “The Equal 
Status and Human Rights of Women.”  In addition, the Cairo Program of Action is 
devoted to issues of gender (Charlesworth 1996).
5 According to Arvonne S. Fraser (1995), this linkage between equality, development 
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Mexico City, has been constant, but the key issues and perspectives changed 
epistemologically and shifted historically. This thesis looks at two key issues: (1) the 
politics of development and (2) building solidarity across differences.  
Epistemologically, I trace the significance of a shift from a “Women in Development”
(WID) paradigm, pervasive at the first conference, to a “Gender and Development” 
(GAD) approach that was called for at the Nairobi conference, and also to “Gender 
Mainstreaming” and “empowerment” strategies that emerged at the Beijing conference.
These practical strategy shifts have always interacted with the academic discourses on 
“women” and “gender.”  I also describe the political conflicts that erupted between 
South and North, and East and West at the conferences,6 and describe some of the 
strategies to resolve them, including the significant role played by Black and Third World 
feminists in building women’s solidarity around the world.  Finally, I relate campaigns
for women’s human rights to discourses on universalism and cultural relativism.  In 
examining both practical issues and parallel academic discourses, I show their 
relationship and clarify the larger significance of both theory and practice. 
A. The Politics of Development
    1. From “WID” to “GAD”
and peace was made by the International Alliance of Women in 1926.  In the process of 
preparing the “Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,”
Poland’s draft, which was selected as the committee’s working document, also linked 
equality, development, and peace.  In 1967, the declaration was adopted in the UN 
General Assembly, and in 1980 in Copenhagen the declaration finally evolved into the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW).  Regarding the difference between the “declaration” and the “convention,”
see Fraser (1995).
6 The Copenhagen conference is remembered as the most conflictive of the four 
conferences (Jaquette 1995; Cagatay, Grown and Satiago 1986).
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In Mexico City, in 1975, one heard the abbreviated term “WID”7 discussed everywhere. 
In developing the “Women in Development” or “WID” paradigm, feminists had begun 
by questioning traditional modernization theory, as it was still understood in the early 
1970s, especially the view that the capitalist economic development model would 
inevitably result in women’s equality (Jaquette 1982).  Ester Boserup’s Women’s Role in 
Economic Development, published in 1970, was among the earliest critiques.  By 
studying African farms where new technologies and land ownership systems had been 
adopted, she argued that “w ith modernization of agriculture and with migration to the 
towns, a new sex pattern of productive work must emerge….The obvious danger is, 
however, that in the course of this transition women will be deprived of their productive 
functions, and the whole process of growth will thereby be retarded” (5).  Therefore, she 
recommended “new educational and training programmes [for women]…to reduce the 
productivity gap between male and female labor” (225).  The WID paradigm, then, was 
intended to gain equity for women in the development process by creating compensatory 
programs that would fully integrate them into the modernizing economy.  This principle 
was written into the World Plan of Action that was produced at the Mexico City 
conference in the statement that “the full and complete development of a country, the 
welfare of the world and the cause of peace require the maximum participation of women 
as well as men in all fields”  (paragraph 4), and significantly influenced the design of 
development projects at both the level of international agencies and individual country 
initiatives thereafter.  Most important were the collection of labor force and education 
7 The term “Women in Development” or “WID” was also adopted by the women’s 
caucus formed in 1972, of the U.S. professional association, Society for International 
Development (Tinker 1990), the Association for Women in Development (AWID), and a 
“desk” of the U.S. State Department’s Agency for International Development.
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statistics on women and special training programs to prepare them for newly created job 
opportunities. 
Nonetheless, only ten years later, at the 1985 World Conference on Women in 
Nairobi, feminists were criticizing the WID approach and calling for its replacement with 
a “Gender and Development” or “GAD” approach.8  WID was dubbed a merely 
“additive approach,” and WID advocates were blamed for ignoring other, possibly even 
more detrimental, consequences of traditional development practices such as the sexual 
division of labor (Elson 1990; Fergusen 2000; Moser 1993).  As Lucille Mathurin Mair 
(later, secretary-general of the Copenhagen conference), looking back to 1975, stated: 
“Women in Development became the Decade’s overnight catchphrase, a seductive one, 
which for a time, at least, could evade the question of what kind of development women
were to be drawn into” (UN 1986 Report, quoted in Tinker 1990). 
        “GAD” as a term also captured the conceptual shift that a small group of 
researchers meeting in Bangalore, India, in 1984, were advocating.  Drawing on the 
work of diverse grass-roots organizations in the Third World, this group, calling itself 
Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN), proposed alternative 
forms of development that would alter power relationships between women and men, 
rather than the WID approach, which, in the view of DAWN, had sought the integration 
of women into existing patterns of development without weakening male dominance (Sen 
and Grown 1987).  And then, at the 1985 NGO preparatory forum, according to Helen I. 
Safa (1985), “The workshop on development, which I [Safa] chaired and which was 
attended by almost 100 participants, rejected the notion that women have not been 
8 L. Shahanti, Secretary-General of the Nairobi conference, officially put forward the 
need to re-examine the meaning of “integration of women in development” at the third 
plenary meeting (UN 1985, paragraph 64-67).  
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integrated into the development process while insisting that the form and nature of their 
participation needs to be changed” (198). The “First World Survey on the Role of 
Women in Development,” which served as a background report for the Nairobi 
conference, summarized these criticisms of WID, emphasizing that women have always 
worked, but that their work was invisible, ignored, and undervalued.   The problem was 
not lack of participation, but the invisibility of women who, “by virtue of an accident of 
birth, perform two-thirds of the world’s work, receive one tenth of its income and own 
less than one hundredth of its property” (UN 1984).
These criticisms were repeated in academic texts–including Development, Crises, 
and Alternative Visions published by DAWN--and buttressed by research that showed the 
continuing disadvantages women experienced in Third World countries. Diane Elson, in 
Male Bias in the Development Process (1990), argued that it was inevitable to move on 
from “WID” to another approach that emphasized gender relations. She asserted, “[WID] 
facilitates the view that ‘women’s issues can be tackled in isolation from women’s 
relation to men.  It may even give rise to the feeling that the problem is women rather 
than the disadvantages women face; and that women are unreasonably asking for special 
treatment” (1).  As she points out, in spite of the contribution of “WID” to improvement 
in some areas, such as employment, health care, and water provision for women, it had 
basic limitations that overlooked power dynamics; therefore, it would not change 
women’s subordination.
Other scholars pointed to additional problems and limitations in the WID 
approach.  Barker (2000), for example, wrote, “[T]his early work participated in a 
discursive construction of Third World women as a passive, kindred, and oppressed 
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group--the resources for the economic interests of corporate capitalism and the 
intellectual interests of development experts” (178).  Naila Kabeer (1994) identified yet 
another problem with the WID paradigm, noting that the majority of scholars who 
developed the WID paradigm lived in the North and had not been able to develop
analyses suited to Third World women’s situation. She also pointed out that more 
accurate data, which the WID strategists insisted on, might assist in improving planning 
procedures, but would not bring about the radical revisions necessary to transform gender 
power relations. 
As an alternative, the Gender and Development (GAD) approach emphasized a 
long-term strategy (strategic gender interests) for women’s liberation instead of short-
term tactics (practical gender interests) for improving women’s material situation.9
According to this new perspective, women’s inclusion in a nation’s development was not 
in and of itself enough to obtain the goal of ultimate gender equality.  Rather, what was 
required was a change in gender norms, principles, and standards in all areas of society.  
In order to do this, “gender planning” and “gender analysis” were mentioned as important 
tools for implementation of GAD.  Caroline O.N. Moser, in Gender Planning and 
Development (1993), asserted that gender planning as a new methodology would result in 
9 When analyzing Nicaragua’s socialist revolution, Maxine Molyneux (1985) suggested 
that “women’s interests” should be replaced with “gender interests,” because the term 
“women’s interests” suggests a false homogeneity among women whose social situations 
are completely different and diverse.  She then divided “gender interests” into “strategic 
interests” and “practical interests.”  Following her analysis, these terms became very 
popular among policymakers as well as feminists.  However, some scholars such as 
Wieringa (1994) suggest not dividing practical and strategic interests, arguing that they 
are not as clearly separable as most of the use of this distinction in the literature implies.  
But generally, the formulation of this distinction is believed to help people think 
strategically about “what is required to tackle gender and development issues in a 
pragmatic way in the context of existing programmes and projects, without losing sight of 
the fundamental changes required to truly tackle gender inequalities” (Rowlands 1998).
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“women’s release from subordination and emancipation” (90) through the tool of 
identifying gender roles and needs, based on the knowledge of feminist theories and 
WID/GAD debates.  Catherine Overholt, Kathleen Cloud, Mary Anderson and James 
Austin (1991) proposed that a “gender analysis framework” be included in the entire 
process of project identification, design, implementation, and evaluation by assessing 
women’s needs, defining project objectives related to women’s needs, and identifying 
possible negative effects on women (18-20).  The WID approach was based on the 
underlying rationale that development processes would proceed much better if women 
were fully incorporated into them, but did not question the values and goals of the 
development process or the paradigm of liberal economic theory (Sen and Grown 1987). 
In contrast, the GAD approach maintained that to focus on women in isolation was to 
ignore the real problem, which remained their subordinate status to men, and argued that 
to change norms of development processes was more significant (Kabeer 1994; Moser 
1993; Barker 2000). 
Debates over development process do not appear to have ended at Nairobi, 
however. At Beijing, criticisms of GAD addressed the difficulty of implementing
“gender” theories in practice.  For example, Nighat Khan, director of the Applied 
Socioeconomic Research Organization of Pakistan, argued “gender analysis had become 
a technocratic discourse, in spite of its roots in socialist feminism, dominated by 
researchers, policymakers, and consultants, which no longer addressed issues of power 
central to women’s subordination” (Baden and Goetz 1997, 39).  Eudine Barriteau, 
presenting on a panel for DAWN, described in concrete terms how in Jamaica the shift in 
discourse from women to gender had resulted in shifting the focus away from women, to 
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“men at risk” (39).10  Mary K. Mayer and Elisabeth Prugl, in their introduction to 
Gender Politics in Global Governance (1999), concluded: “This shift from women to 
gender move[d] attention from women’s subordination to gender constructions, from the 
politics and choices of agents to gendered structures that passively envelop both women 
and men” (6). 
The shift from “WID” to “GAD” may be viewed as a shift in practice parallel to 
the shift from “sex” to “gender” in theoretical texts. Feminist scholars first used the 
term “gender” instead of “sex” to escape biological determinism. Since French feminist 
Simone de Beauvoir (1947) wrote that women are not “born, but made” in society, 
feminists in academia have analyzed how societies have constructed different roles for 
women and men at the micro level as well as at the macro level.  Even today, when 
feminists have come to agree that gender cannot be analyzed outside of racial, ethnic, and 
class hierarchies, gender remains at the core of their analyses, since the meaning and 
structural effects of race, ethnicity, and class are always gendered (Ferree et al. 2000). 
However, the use of gender by scholars has shifted in different and diverse ways in 
different fields of study.  In 1985,11 for example, Joan Scott considered a new use of 
“gender” by adopting a postmodernist approach to this concept. In “Gender: A Useful 
Category of Historical Analysis,” she asserted that gender is grounded in sex because 
bodies cannot be represented as entirely social.  Thus, she rejected the traditional binary 
usage of sex and gender, because “gender assumes the prior existence of sexual 
difference.”  In her view, sex is not simply “natural,” but like gender is also a conceptual 
10 “Men at risk” refers to their lower educational degree attainment.  As many feminists 
have argued, however, this has not affected men’s higher social status. 
11 Scott’s essay, “Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis,” was first presented 
at the Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association, December 1985, and was 
published as a chapter in her Gender and the Politics of History, 1988.
14
constitution, “a form of knowledge.”  Judith Butler’s theorizing on gender as 
“performance” continued and extended postmodernist views.  As Kath Weston (2002) 
argued, “according to Butler, gender is not a core identity or essence that precedes 
expression, but rather a social product created through the practice of relating to other 
people….Performativity theories work against the reification of gender by attempting to 
explain how the impression of substantively existing masculinities and feminities 
emerges from essentially nothing” (64, 40). 
2. Feminism and Development Practices
    a) “Empowerment”
In Kath Weston’s view, however, “gender theory,” especially as explicated by Butler, 
becomes ahistorical and nonpolitical. Weston suggests that to explore gender theory 
properly we should look at practices as well as academic discourse. What do theories of 
“women” and “gender” look like in actual development practices?  
Changes in development practices have evolved incrementally over the past three 
decades. Starting in the early 1970s, a number of public agencies--of the UN (e.g., the 
United Nations Development Program, or UNDP) and wealthy countries (like the US’s 
Agency for International Development, or USAID), international agencies like the World 
Bank, and local governments--funded projects that showed the influence of feminist 
critiques of earlier so-called modernization projects.  These projects, which most 
resembled the WID paradigm, usually emphasized girls’ and women’s education 
programs.12
12 There have been a number of projects from the 1970s to the present, conducted in the 
name of WID, focusing on girls’ education and women’s training in the Third World.  
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Criticism of development projects also evolved, as feminist researchers came to 
view these WID-style projects as too limited in their impact. Although feminists were 
sometimes successful in influencing public agencies to addres s women’s needs more 
broadly, more often they were not. Projects that aimed to transform relationships of 
power between women and men were more likely to be privately funded. For example, 
one private agency, the New York-based Population Council, whose programs were 
intended to encourage family planning, began to funnel money only to those governments 
who would also include attention to health and other social welfare issues in their 
projects.13 But more and more frequently, Third World women themselves formed their 
own NGOs, drew up proposals for development, and obtained funding from either private 
foundations (like the Ford or the Rockefeller foundations) or progressive governments 
like Denmark.  At the 1995 Beijing conference, these Third World NGOs were 
discussed using the term “empowerment.”14
The term “empowerment” does not, however, map well onto the feminist GAD 
paradigm or even academic gender theory. In so far as “empowerment” is used to 
describe projects designed by Third World policymakers and researchers, 
“empowerment” would seem to exemplify the ideals of a group like DAWN that indeed 
See the list and summaries of WID programs at the homepage of UN Economic and 
Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP): 
http://www.unescap.org/wid/04widresources/database/.
13 I thank Lynn Bolles for providing me with this example. 
14 Empowerment projects have usually been conducted with NGOs’ participation based 
on diverse funding and donors.  See, for examples, “Empowerment Project for Women 
in the Gaza Strip” (http://www.novartisfoundation.com/social_development/ women_
empowerment gaza.htm ), the “US-Nicaragua Women’s Empowerment Project”
(http://www.wccnica.org/women.html) and the “Women’s Empowerment and 
Socioeconomic Development Project in Tajikistan (http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/B-
SPAN/tajikistan_empowerment /tajikistan_slides.ppt). 
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used “GAD” to characterize their approach.15  But in many ways, “empowerment” --
encouraging separate women’s enterprisers-- maps most closely onto the politics 
developed by radical feminists in the late 1970s-1980s.16  Certainly this was true of the 
kinds of projects these Third World women began to implement–those that funded poor 
women themselves in ways that could provide them the tools and means to become self-
sustaining (Afshar 1998; Osmani 1998). Marilee Karl (1995) called this 
“entrepreneurial self-reliance” (108) and pointed to projects such as Grameen Bank17 as 
examples.  Nazneen Kanji (2003) also added the Self Employment Women’s 
Association in India as “one of the best examples” (5).
However, “empowerment” does not necessarily belong to a specific perspective; 
rather different communities of practice use and emphasize this term in the same and 
different ways. In this respect, “empowerment” is also a “boundary object.”  Marilee 
Karl (1995) identified two “empowerment” approaches: one is “through economic 
interventions” to increase women’s economic status through employment, income 
generation and access to credit; the other is “through awareness building, capacity 
building, and organizing women” (109). Jo Rowlands (1998) points out that this word is 
used by people representing a wide range of political and philosophical perspectives, 
from the World Bank to feminists.18  She asserts that “empowerment” can be used in 
15 Nazneen Kanji (2003) connected the empowerment approach with the voice from the 
South : “The empowerment approach was influenced by anti-colonial struggles, with 
theoretical roots in neo-Marxism and dependence theory” (4-5).
16 An excellent example of radical feminist theory that explores women’s empowerment 
would be Adrienne Rich’s Of Women Born (1977).
17 Grameen Bank has provided credits, without requiring any collateral, to the very 
poorest in rural Bangladesh, and had 2.4 million borrowers in 2002, 95 percent of whom 
were women (http://www.grameen-info.org/index.html).
18 There is another example of how this term is used: in the Human Development Report 
of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the Gender Empowerment 
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different ways, corresponding to how one understands the concept of power.  One 
example would be a “power-over” view of power, where one person, or group of people,
controls the actions or options of another, suggesting that women should fight men in 
order to attain power, or in order to reject men’s power.  However, Hartsock (1983) 
offered a quite different concept of power,19 in which power is “energy and competence 
rather than dominance” (224).  According to Hartsock’s approach, the important
question is who empowers whom, not who dominates whom.  In this respect, the 
DAWN statement is an example of an “empowerment approach” because it represents 
Third World women’s perspectives.  DAWN also calls for the “empowerment” of 
individual women by stressing the value of participatory democracy as a process (Sen 
and Grown 1987, 89).
b) “Gender Mainstreaming”
In feminist development practice, “empowerment” approaches were only one of the 
strategies feminists came to advocate in their ongoing critique of projects they considered 
ineffective in practice.  They also advocated “gender mainstreaming”–a strategy that 
would seem to be closer to Scott’s use of “gender,” because this strategy addressed 
Measure ranks nations, based on a composite measure of income, participation in 
professional and managerial jobs, and formal political participation.  Baden and Goetz 
(1997) asserted that this was ironic because “the rhetoric of grassroots, collective, 
bottom-up development (“empowerment”) is invoked to name a top-down and 
universalizing statistic” (41). 
19 In Money, Sex, and Power: Toward a Feminist Historical Materialism, Hartsock 
examined three feminist scholars, Hannah Arendt, Dorothy Emmet, and Hanna Pitkin 
regarding questions of power, identified their commonality, and called it “the feminist 
theory of power” (224).  Arendt linked power with community; as a result, power was 
viewed as “ability,” “potentiality,” and “empowerment” in community.  Emmet argued
against the concept of power as domination.  Pitkin, relying on Arendt and Emmet, had 
put forward “power to” by arguing against “power over,” in which power was thought of 
as a “capacity” to do something alone for community.
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women’s incorporation into the machinery of the nation-state. Although this strategy still 
encouraged the setting up of a separate bureaucracy, the purpose of this agency would be 
to transform gender relations broadly in all aspects of society.20  Anne Marie Goetz 
(1998) viewed gender mainstreaming as the strategy for “institutionalizing GAD 
concerns in the state” (42), and particularly noted the importance of mainstreaming an 
“agenda across other government departments” (62).  
The trend towards gender mainstreaming seems to have both positive and 
negative possibilities at the same time.  On the one hand, a gender mainstreaming 
strategy can contribute to reframing national and international administrative and 
legislative bodies by forcing them to recognize the importance of gender factors.  On the 
other hand, it assumes that a government unit will actually implement policies aimed at 
undermining patriarchy—a dubious assumption at best.  Thus “gender mainstreaming”
could lose its politically radical aspect.  Just as Weston warned that “gender” theory is 
apolitical, similarly, “gender mainstreaming” in practice, with its suggestion of 
“neutrality,” is potentially a disappointing strategy for those who expect women’s 
liberation from its implementation. 
One should also note that, in practice, “WID” never really disappeared, but rather 
still continued to be used in the official documents produced by governments and some 
international institutions such as the World Bank and the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP).  Tinker (1990) believes this may be because the meanings of WID 
had proved useful.  For example, in order to overcome bureaucratic resistance at a 
practical level, proponents of the WID approach have successfully argued that 
20 The advocates of “gender mainstreaming” tend to prefer “sectoral and technical 
departments” within other institutions to “small and under-funded women’s units.”  See 
Baden and Goetz (1997).   
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development projects would be more likely to succeed if women were an integral part of 
both design and implementation.  As Caroline Moser (1993) has noted, the distinction
between WID and GAD today is not so clear as once thought. 
B. From Difference to Solidarity
1. What Are “Women’s Interests”? 
Since women’s economic and social situations are different in every country, women’s 
points of view are naturally not homogeneous.  If so, how can women become “citizen-
subjects” for a new global terrain that can unite them with similarly positioned citizen-
subjects within and across national borders into a new post-Western-empire alliance
(Sandoval 2002)?  Is it possible to escape from the pitfall of either universalism or 
cultural relativism through conferences bringing women from all over the globe together 
(Ahmed 2000)?
There were a lot of inevitable differences and implicit or explicit conflicts among 
delegates from different countries and regions at these conferences.  For example, 
generally, the communist countries were said to emphasize women’s role for achieving 
“peace.”  Countries of the Third World tended to pursue “development.”  The U.S. and 
European countries were likely to express their interests by emphasizing the goal of 
“equality” (Jaquette 1994, 48-49; also see Bunch 2001, 134-135; Moghadam 1996; Chow 
1996).  Hanna Papanek (1975) tells us a very vivid story by revealing the conflict 
between Western and Third World delegations at the Mexico City conference: 
It was important to learn that the bitter resentment of Latin American women against the 
United States did not exclude those of us from the United States just because we were 
women.  A woman from the United States stood at the floor mike to ask, “Have I been 
put down by the men in my country for fifty-two years only to be put down again here by 
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all of you?” The reply, if there is one, came a little later from a Japanese woman who 
asked, “What are we women from the industrial countries doing to fulfill our 
responsibilities to women elsewhere?  How many of us are speaking out to our own 
governments about the things with which we do not agree and which our governments are 
doing? (217)
The conflict between East and West and between South and North was especially harsh at 
the second conference in Copenhagen, where the Israeli-Palestinian crisis erupted at the 
conference with the question of including the equation of Zionism and racism in the final 
document.21
Conflicts and disagreements seem to have centered on what constituted a 
“women’s issue.”  At both Mexico City and Copenhagen, Western delegations largely 
viewed women’s low status as a consequence of legal discrimination, while Third World 
and communist country delegates faulted international economic exploitation and 
colonialism.  Western government delegates were suspicious of the South’s “structural 
agenda,” which they viewed as diversionary and as “politicizing” the conferences.22  On 
the other hand, feminists from the South, in addition to a few Western feminists, rejected 
the view that these “political” issues were not “ women’s issues.” They argued that
global problems are always interrelated (Jaquette 1995, 48; also see Cagatay, Grown and 
21 Ultimately, four countries--the United States, Canada, Australia, and Israel--voted 
against the Program of Action in which Zionism was defined as racism; other Western 
delegations abstained.  The U.S. press labeled it a diplomatic defeat, and the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) declared it a “victory.”  U.S. official analysis stated that 
the United States should have been better led and prepared, and that the conference 
secretariat was not a neutral arbiter in the conflicts between the United States, Israel, and 
the Western bloc, on the one side, and the developing countries and the Eastern European 
bloc on the other.  Some accounts describe the international women’s movement as 
“immature,” unable to hold on to its own agenda, and claimed that the conference was 
“politicized” by men’s interests (Jaquette 1995).  
22 “Politics” here refers to international politics among nation-states and not the broader 




Ronald D. Branch, in Black Women at the United Nations, edited by Hanes 
Walton Jr. (1995), wrote about the roles of U.S. official delegates whose progressive 
political views were in conflict with American policies fashioned by the State 
Department, arguing that “delegates are not expected to act as robots” (13), even though
the official delegates have a responsibility, after all, to follow their countries’ instructions 
and reflect the position of the current administration.  Thus, the possibility of 
“diplomatic protest” always existed (usually based on the grounds that the act or policy in 
question violates either international law or what is asserted to be universally accepted 
morality [Walton 1995, D’Amico 1999]).  Just as African American delegates were 
more sensitive to the policies related to African countries’ independence, most female 
delegates were likely to support women’s issues.  At the Copenhagen conference, there 
were several attempts to practice “diplomatic protest”; for example, when U.S. African-
American women representing various NGOs held a press conference to present a draft 
resolution that condemned racism and defined it in more broad terms than apartheid, 
women of color on the official U.S. delegation immediately supported it, overcoming the 
State Department’s hesitations, and introduced an anti-racism resolution in the official 
committee meeting (US Delegation Report 118-19, in Jaquette 1995, 53).  In this respect, 
the 1980 conference at Copenhagen “test[ed] the strength and unity of the international 
women’s movement and its ability to accommodate differences” (Winslow 1995, 180).
In time, however, feminists from each bloc came to develop a greater 
understanding of one another, and to learn how to negotiate with one another, and were 
able to produce a transnational consensus.  In order to determine how women situated 
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themselves to make an alliance in spite of great differences, we need to follow their shift 
in consciousness.  After the Copenhagen conference, some participants were “ skeptical 
about the usefulness of such future world gatherings”23 (Cagatay et al. 1986, 402); but 
the atmosphere at the next conference held in Nairobi, in 1985, was very different from
that of Copenhagen.  Cagatay, Grown and Santiago (1986) pointed to the different 
situations between Copenhagen and Nairobi and hypothesized that the fact that the 
conference was held in Africa where so many Western feminists could come to 
understand Third World women’s situations was significant.  Also, the world economic 
crisis and the accompanying ideological movement toward conservatism and religious 
fundamentalism between 1980 and 1985 may have reinforced the commonality of 
women’s experience with gender subordination across these blocs.  And Moghadam 
(1996), in tracing the debates at the Beijing conference, noted that by 1995 the significant 
confrontation ceased to be between feminists from South and North, or East and West, 
but had shifted instead to that of a feminist and progressive worldview vs. a conservative 
or religious fundamentalist worldview.  The UN CD-Rom, Women Go Global,
summarizes the atmosphere at Beijing thus: “The differences once experienced as 
irreconcilable were bridged as women perceived their common interests across 
previously ideological divides” (UN 2002).
It is useful to note here the role of Western women of color and Third World 
women in building a transnational alliance.  I have already mentioned what African 
American women did at the Copenhagen conference in negotiating an acceptable 
compromise on an antiracism statement.  At each of the subsequent UN conferences, 
23 For a skeptical point of view on the Copenhagen conference, see Irene Tinker, “A 
Feminist View of Copenhagen,” Signs Vol. 6 (Spring 1981): 531-35.
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they continued to build networks between South and North, and between governmental
and non-governmental organizations, and drafted resolutions to recommend for additions 
to the official documents. Mallika Dutt (1996), reflecting on the Beijing conference 
through the lens of a U.S. woman of color, spoke of her recognition that women of color 
were not exempt from being perceived as Americans.  She concluded by criticizing the 
tendency of women of color to organize solely within their own communities: “Although 
women of color must focus on their own ethnic communities in order to build strong 
bases for political action, it is also critical that they begin to provide much-needed 
national leadership that crosses ethnic and identity lines. [Otherwise] they perpetuate the 
problem of white women being perceived as national leaders while women of color are 
seen only as speaking for their own particular ethnicity or concern.”  Both Esther Ngan-
ling Chow and Amrita Basu pointed out that at Beijing U.S. women of color did in fact 
take the leadership role Dutt called for: “Forging a unique coalition, they held a series of 
caucus meetings demonstrating a great sense of camaraderie and validation of each other 
as equals and a desire to work toward unity and solidarity”(Chow 1996, 189).  And from 
Basu: “One important explanation for the diminution of tension between women’s 
movements in the North and South [was] the increasingly important influence of women 
of color in shaping debates about feminism in the United States”(79).  Third World 
women also played a significant role.  One example was DAWN, which included 
development researchers, policymakers, and activists from both North and South but with 
leadership from southern feminists (Bunch 2001, 135).  From a small group coming 
together for the first time in 1984, this group became the model of transnational activism 
beyond the division between South and North. 
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2. Women’s Rights as Human Rights
Successful negotiation among South/North and East/West feminists is perhaps most visible in 
the “women’s rights are human rights” campaign leading up to, and at, the Beijing 
conference.  The impetus seems to have been feminist transnational networking in 
preparation for the UN Conference on Human Rights, held in Vienna in 1993.  
Understanding that this conference would be an occasion for reinterpreting and broadening  
the scope of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted in the United Nations in 
1948), feminists were spurred to have women’s interests included.  Thus, Women’s Human 
Rights was a global campaign from the start (Bunch 2001; Dauer 2001).  In Vienna, a loose 
coalition of groups24 and individuals were successful in having these words included in the 
Declaration and Program of Action: “The human rights of women and of the girl-child are an 
inalienable, integral, and indivisible part of universal human rights” (UN 1993, paragraph 18). 
It may not be clear immediately what was new about this statement, since the 1945 
United Nations Charter had already recognized “human rights and fundamental freedoms for 
all without distinction as to race, sex, language and religion” (my emphasis).  But the 1945 
definition of “universal” human rights was the narrow view inherited from seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century Enlightenment philosophy.  Not only were social and economic justice 
issues excluded, but so too were issues viewed as particular to women, such as violence 
against women (rape, battery, murder, female genital mutilation, or trafficking).  And even 
though these issues had been on the feminist agenda for more than twenty years, the Vienna 
conference opened up the possibility of including these issues in an expanded definition of 
24 The Global Campaign for Women’s Human Rights was organized to prepare and 
influence the Vienna conference; they organized the Vienna Tribunal for Women’s 
Human Rights, in which thirty-three women testified about their personal experiences of 
violence and had their testimonies judged by a distinguished panel (Dauer 2001, 68). 
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human rights guaranteed by the United Nations.  An international coalition of feminists had 
not only formed to press for this at Vienna, but in circular fashion, these issues then came 
under the protection of the global community of nations. 
The solidarity of feminists was only strengthened by the worldwide resurgence of 
religious fundamentalism.  This was all too evident at the Beijing conference where the 
significant South/North or East/West divisions separating women gave way to a progressive 
feminist vs. conservative religious division—both of which were global in reach.  The 
conservatives were a coalition of Muslim and Catholic states, including (and likely the 
directing force) the Vatican as an observer state.  Their common ground was their views on 
family, motherhood, religion, and women as “bearers of tradition” or “carriers of the cultural 
purity of their particular group” (Bunch 2001, 134; Desai 2002).  Moghadam (1996) 
summarized the atmosphere of the Beijing conference: “The Muslim-Catholic coalition, and 
the decision of some Muslim countries not to be part of it, seems to suggest at least two 
things.  One is that notions of a Western-Islamic civilizational clash are exaggerated, for 
there is considerable consensus among Muslims, Catholics, Protestant fundamentalists, and 
right-wing nonfundamentalist Americans over religion, family, and sexuality.  The real 
contention globally is between a conservative view (some would call it patriarchal) and a 
liberal view (some would call it libertarian) on these matters” (80). 
The clashes between progressives (and feminists) and conservatives (and religious 
fundamentalists) came on the debates over the use of the terms gender, sexual orientation, 
and women’s unremunerated work.  Some of these were resolved in the process of 
negotiation.25  Feminists failed, however, to have the term “sexual orientation” included 
25 When failing to prevent the inclusion of the term gender in the final version of the 
Platform for Action, the Vatican noted in its final statement to the conference that its 
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under the umbrella of human rights despite lesbian groups’ enthusiastic lobby.26  Violence 
against women such as murder (e.g., “honor” or “shame” killing),27 battery and rape, which 
had long occurred in both private and public areas without appropriate punishment, gained a 
new official status as human rights violations.  Bunch (2001) pointed out that women’s 
claims became more indisputable by defining these kinds of violence as human rights 
violations.  There was acclaim from women all around the world celebrating women’s 
solidarity and praising women’s human rights; the remarks of former first lady of the U.S., 
Hillary R. Clinton are an example: “We also recognized that women will never gain full 
dignity until their human rights are respected and protected.  Our goals for this conference, 
to strengthen families and societies by empowering women to take greater control over their
own destinies, cannot be fully achieved unless all governments accept their responsibility to 
protect and promote internationally recognized human rights” (Clinton 1995).  
Why did feminists resurrect human rights concepts for their struggles against diverse 
forms of violence against women?  The human rights concept has a long history dating back 
to the natural law theories of the seventeenth century in Western society, which treat rights as 
inherent.  According to European liberal ideology, the polity is divided into family, civil 
society, and state, with the family sphere perceived as natural.  Because the public and 
private dichotomy of liberalism assumes that the rights bearer is the head of the family (i.e., 
members understood the term gender to be “grounded in biological sexual identity, male 
or female….The Holy See thus excludes dubious interpretations based on world views 
which assert that sexual identity ca n be adapted indefinitely to suit new and different 
purposes” (UN Report 1995, quoted in Bunch and Fried 1996, 202).
26 As Palesa Beverley Ditsie (1996), on behalf of the International Gay and Lesbian 
Human Rights Commission, argued: “the term ‘sexual orientation’ is currently in 
brackets. If these words are omitted from the relevant paragraphs, the Platform for Action 
will stand as one more symbol of the discrimination that lesbians face and of the lack of 
recognition of our very existence” (106).   
27 At the Beijing+5 conference in 2000, “honor killing” was renamed “shame killing” by 
the UN general head, Kofi Anan (UN 2000).
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the one who represents the family in civil society and the state), concepts of rights focus on 
protecting “his” natural rights in the family from “government” as a potential violator, rather 
than raising “her” rights not to be abused by “him” (Okin 2000).  Women, who belong to the 
family but are excluded from civil society and state, as was the case prior to the twentieth 
century, do not therefore have protected rights. 
Concepts of human rights, however, are not static.  Feminists have successfully
challenged the perception that family, civil society, and the state are separated and nearly 
everywhere have legitimated women’s participation in civil society and the state.  It is for 
this reason that feminists have felt emboldened to challenge violations taking place in the 
name of cultures, religions and national sovereignty, basing their claims on women’s human 
rights. 
In feminist practice, as Bunch and Fried (1996) have pointed out, “[Women’s 
human rights claims] represent a shift in analysis that moves beyond single-issue politics 
or identity-based organizing and enhances women’s capacity to build global alliances 
based on collective political goals and a common agenda.”  However, claims based on 
women’s human rights are not without risk to the larger feminist agenda.  Because the 
claim of women’s human rights seemingly presumes women’s commonality all around 
the world, some feminists expressed concern that this rights-based politics will lead us to 
ignore the diverse and different situations between South and North or between 
developed and developing countries.  For example, Inderpal Grewal (1998) points out, 
“the struggle to keep various kinds of differences alive in the women’s human rights 
arena is a difficult one” (507).  Sunila Abeysekera (2003) also calls for caution 
concerning the negative effects of rights-based movements; it is her concern, however, 
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that the women’s human rights movement is likely to focus just on the area of violence 
against women, while ignoring other issues stemming from unequal social and economic 
relationships.  We need to keep these risks in mind for the concept of women’s human 
rights to have a positive effect in creating solidarity among women’s movements.  
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III. Think Globally, Act Locally
A. Transnational Feminism 
We are now living in a period when the flows of capital and labor, in addition to 
migration, electronic communication, and international finance have led, seemingly 
inevitably, to what we call “globalization.”  Several feminist researchers in International 
Relations and Economics have examined the “gendered effects” 28 of the globalization 
process.  For Aslanbeigui, Pressman and Summerfield, globalization has had a negative 
effect.  In the introduction to the book they edited, Women in the Age of Economic 
Transformation (1994), which presents the results of research conducted in twelve 
countries in Europe, Asia, Africa, and America, they write: “Women’s relative losses 
have been manifested in different ways, but in every country examined in this volume, 
economic transformation has led to fewer gains or greater losses for women” (2).29  In 
spite of the gloomy fact that women are being reconstructed as low-wage workers in the 
global economic system, however, there seems to be an opposite facet; the access to 
wages and salaries, the “growing feminization of the job supply,” and “the growing 
feminization of business opportunities” have brought about an alteration in gender 
28 “Gendered effects” here refers to the phenomenon that economic development, 
especially globalization, has different effects on women and men.  Gita Sen (1999)
mentions, “Gender-biased or ‘gendered’ labor markets, as we call them, are not only a
problem for women workers.  They also trap economies on the so-called low road of
labour-intensive growth, making it difficult to garner the full fruits of growth, or to
ensure its sustainability.”  The Official Report of the year 2000 Beijing+5 conference 
affirms also, in a “gender impact” section that the globalization process has had a 
negative impact on women in developed countries as well as the developing countries 
themselves (paragraph 35).
29 Sunwook Kim, in “Globalization and Women’s Policy in Korea (2000)” also comes to 
this conclusion in her discussion of Korea and globalization: “[T]he positive affects of 
globalization have yet to appear, and the negative influences have been experienced more 
greatly” (60). 
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hierarchies within the family as well as in work places and society (Moghadam 2000; 
Sassen 1998).
Parallel to globalization, moreover, a cross-cultural consciousness in the name of 
transnationalism has emerged beyond nation-state and regional boundaries.  Saadawi 
(2000), comparing globalization with transnationalism in a very political way, writes: 
“The neocolonial capitalist powers try to globalize from above, economically. They try 
to break the boundaries between countries, so that capital flow and benefit accrues to 
their property….[T]ransnationalism, to me, is used by people who struggle against 
globalization. It’s more or less globalization from below” (15, 14).  We should 
remember, however, that the new global consciousness is not confined only to 
progressive transnational struggle against the negative effects of economic globalization; 
religious fundamentalists and cultural conservatives have also developed international 
coalitions in the name of protecting so-called “family values” from the feminist challenge, 
as we saw at the Beijing conference. 
“Global feminism” or “transnational feminism” has emerged as part of the new 
consciousness in the name of a transnational women’s movement.  However, there 
seems to be a suspicion that the transnational trend can ignore local needs and impose a 
new kind of authority on the Third World.  For example, Grewal (1998) sets forth this 
rather harsh critique: “[G]lobal feminism…is the hegemony of First World women’s 
groups to affect women’s lives and women’s groups worldwide by their interests and 
their policies” (518).  I think this concern is likely to miss how the global and local are 
interconnected to each other.  One of the distinctions of this process of globalization and 
transnational consciousness is that the boundary between the global and local seems to 
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have blurred.  Transnational consciousness as well as capital flows can be viewed as 
homogenizing people’s lives, but at the same time, “local” cultural particularities still 
exist and, in fact, are even sometimes emphasized and reinforced.  Thus, as Bunch 
(2001) suggested, seeing “global” in opposition to the “ local” is “one of those false 
dualisms that we must transcend” (131-132).  Basu (2000) identified another 
problematic dualism, challenging critics who imply that “global”  means North and 
“local” means South.  We need to understand “thinking globally, acting locally”30 as 
“what happens ‘here’ affects what can be thought and done ‘there,’ and vice versa”
(Narayan and Harding 2000, vii).  “Global and local”  do not imply different locations; 
rather, it implies multiplicity of consciousness by emphasizing how “we” (the local) are 
always interconnected with “them”  (the global).
As a result, if transnational movements and organizations are inevitable trends, 
we should ask how to re- organize women’s tasks under this circumstance.  What is at 
stake in order to “think globally” and what we should do to “act locally”?  How should 
we evaluate the processes and results of these global conferences on women?  
International UN conferences not only have contributed to building this new cross-
cultural consciousness, but transnational feminism also has had a positive effect on the 
international conferences.  In Nairobi, a “great diversity of views generated a wealth of 
information on ways in which women’s struggles are carried out within different 
contexts” (Cagatay et al. 1985), and in Beijing, women gained “a great degree of unity in 
diversity among women from the South and the North as they articulate[d] their common 
30 This slogan came from the environmental movement.  The phrase was originated by 
Rene Dubos, an advisor to the UN Conference on Human Environment, in 1972.  He 
intended to convey his conviction that all environmental problems had global aspects, but 
different local situations should also be considered (Eblen and Eblen 1994, 702). 
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concern” (Chow 1996) through their campaign for “women’s human rights,” and their 
confrontation with a new conservative coalition. 
The expansion of the number and extension of the role of NGOs is one of the 
phenomena resulting from transnationalism.  The CSW has held international forums of 
NGOs parallel with the governmental conferences since the first conference. The purpose 
of an NGO Forum was not confined only to influencing individual governments, but also 
to participating in the international norm-making process as an active agent.  However, 
there seems to be the potential for harm from this transnational NGO trend: “In some 
respects, the growth of transnational women's movements has clearly exacerbated 
divisions within the women's movement. Although global networks are often formed 
across North-South lines, they are quite good at facilitating links between those groups 
that have the resources and ability to attend international conferences,to join international 
networks, and to hook into new forms of technology….And in the process, of course, this 
exacerbates class divisions between the globaed [sic] middle classes and the poor.
Transnational social movements come to rely more heavily on elites who possess 
globally marketable skills” (Basu 2003).  Regarding this concern, however, Moghadam 
(2000) expressed a relatively positive perspective: “Many feminist organizations are 
middle-class and often elite, but class lines are increasingly blurred as women 
professionals and women proletarians find common cause around personal, economic, 
and social issues…” (153). Therefore, we need to find a balance between two different 
perspectives: how to accelerate NGOs’ activities in connecting grassroots movements 
with global concerns, and how to overcome the potential danger of NGOs’ new class 
division, if we are to successfully build global movements on behalf of all women.
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B. The Korean Government Responds 
Korean participation in the UN world conferences, along with the globalization of capital 
and labor and the parallel transnational shift of consciousness, has had a significant 
impact on Korean society. On the one hand, a number of positive changes, such as the 
establishment of national machineries and new laws and regulations for women have 
appeared during this period.  Similarly, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and almost all resolutions on women 
passed in the UN General Assembly were ratified.  On the other hand, Korean women’s 
lives and status do not seem to have improved very much.  According to the Gender 
Equality Measure (GEM) of the UNDP, Korean women’s gender status, compared with 
other countries, still looks problematic, and women’s labor force participation has not 
advanced to the level of other developed countries.  Thus, this appears to be an urgent 
moment for the Korean women’s movement to examine its current situation and 
reconsider its tasks for the future. 
The most noticeable result of Korea’s participation in the UN conferences was the 
establishment of national machineries on women’s affairs.31  The Plan for Action in 
1975 suggested establishing “interdisciplinary and multisectoral machinery within 
government such as national commissions, women’s bureaus and other bodies…for 
accelerating the achievement of equal opportunity for women and their full integration in 
31 Even before national machinery on women was established, Women’s Studies lectures 
were offered at Ewha Womans’ University (1977).  This is said to be one of the impacts 
of the Mexico City conference (Mi-kyung Lee 1999). 
34
national life” (paragraph 34).  This suggestion was detailed in the Copenhagen 
conference Program of Action: 
Where it does not exist, national machinery should be established and should 
systematically review its objectives and methodology in the light of the experience 
acquired….(Paragraph 42) 
And again: 
Effective institutional links between national machinery and national planning units as 
well as national women’s organizations, should be established….(Paragraph 43) 
Following these recommendations, women’s groups called for the establishment of 
Korean national machinery to develop women's policies.  The government complied by 
establishing two units in the same year, 1983: The Korean Women's Development 
Institute (KWDI) and the National Committee on Women’s Policies (Yeoseong 
Jeongchaek Simui Wiweonhoe) under the Office of the Prime Minister.  In addition, the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms Discrimination on Women (CEDAW) was 
ratified the next year.32
This process could be viewed as implementing a WID approach, since before 
establishing KWDI, and the National Committee on Women’s Policies, women’s affairs 
had been dealt with in the department of the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW) as a 
part of national welfare policy, where it was invisible.  Only after the Copenhagen 
conference, when KWDI and the Committee were established, did promoting the status 
of women became national policy (Hyun Ja Kim, 1985; Byun 1998; Sun-uk Kim and 
Deuk-Kyoung Yoon 1996).  However, KWDI was a research institute rather than an 
32 At the Copenhagen conference in 1980, sixty countries signed the CEDAW.  In 
Korea, Hyun Ja Kim, a female legislator, raised a question about the government’s 
official stance on ratifying CEDAW at the foreign policy session of Gukhoe (the Korean 
national legislative body) in 1982. Following this debate, CEDAW was ratified in 1984 
(Shin 1994; Yeong-jeong Kim 1994).   
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administrative body in the government system, limited to collecting data and advising the 
government on how women could be integrated into the national development process; 
and the National Committee on Women’s Policies was really only a series of meetings 
and also not a government unit.  After the Nairobi conference, however, national 
machinery was established in the Ministry of Political Affairs II (MPA II).  This was in 
1988, one year after the June Democratic Revolution toppling the almost-three-decade-
long military dictatorship, which also enhanced the possibilities for a national policy 
towards greater gender equality. 
The difference that this made was greater than may seem at first glance.  In the 
policies of MHW, women had been viewed as passive recipients of financial assistance, 
because MHW’s policies were focused on supporting so-called alienated women such as 
poor single mothers and prostitutes who needed social welfare assistance (Hae-suk Lee 
2003; Min 2003).  In contrast, MPA II adopted a gender perspective intended to 
empower women in all aspects of politics and society.  According to the new 
Government Organization Principle, MPA II gathered together all the information related 
to women produced in other ministries and then reviewed them in order to implement its 
own women’s policy.  And even though MPA II lacked the power to interfere directly 
with other ministries’ policies, it could, and did, mediate and coordinate other ministries’ 
policies regarding women’s affairs through the interministerial committee.  
Also following the re-instatement of democracy, many women-related laws were 
revised in line with proposals issuing from the Nairobi conference.  A women’s section 
was included in “The National Long-Term Development Plan toward the Year 2000” in 
1986; “The Mother and Child Health Act” was revised in the same year; and “Guidelines 
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to Eliminate Gender Discrimination” were provided in 1987.  Furthermore, in 1987, an 
article on gender equality in marriage and family life was inserted into the constitutional 
revision and an “Equal Employment Opportunity Act” was passed.  After the Beijing 
conference, progress further accelerated: in 1995, the “Framework Act on Women’s 
Development" was established, which acts as the basic and inclusive law on Korean 
women’s rights.  Article One is explicit in stating its purpose: 
To promote the equality between men and women in all the areas of politics, economy, 
society and culture by stipulating fundamental rules with regard to the obligation, etc, of 
the State and local governments for realization of equality between men and women 
under the Constitution of the Republic of Korea. 
In 1997, the Act to Prevent Sexual Violence was revised, and the Act to Prevent Family 
Violence was passed.  Most recently, in 2000, the Prevention of Gender Discrimination 
and Sexual Harassment Law, intended to provide women with better working conditions, 
was passed.  Such a series of events shows clearly the impact of the UN conferences on 
improving policies concerning women in Korea.  Especially after the Beijing conference, 
in 1995, the Committee to Pursue Globalization formulated the “Ten Tasks for Women's 
Social Participation,” opening up the possibility of affirmative action33 when screening 
government officials and for government committees.  
In 1998, the MPA II was replaced with the Presidential Commission on Women’s 
Affairs (PCWA) in keeping with the new president Kim Dae Jung’s campaign pledge. 
Within the ongoing and heated debates on a proper government organization for women’s 
empowerment, PCWI was a new option; instead of an independent ministry, PCWI, 
33 This was not a quota system, but only an “additional point system.” Regarding this, 
Eun-hee Chi (1996) complains, “The idea of a quota system is based on gender equality 
while that of additional points is based on providing advantage to an inferior gender.”
The affirmative action suggested in “Ten Tasks for Women’s Social Participation”
triggered a debate on the need for special measures to improve women’s status.
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under the immediate direction of the president, was authorized to coordinate other 
ministries’ administrative measures. Alongside PCWA, women’s branches were 
established in six ministries (Justice, Administration, Education, Health and Welfare, 
Labor, and Agriculture and Forestry).  Thus, the PCWA was able to intervene in other 
ministries more efficiently.  But this did not satisfy feminists’ demands.  Although the 
PCWA is believed to have launched women’s policy on a full scale (Kyung-Hee Kim 
2003), women’s groups continued to insist on the establishment of a Ministry of 
Women’s Affairs instead of PCWA (Chi 1996; Sun-uk Kim and Deuk-Kyoung Yoon 
1996), the main difference being that a ministry can compile its own budget and propose 
bills. (The PCWA, as a commission, could not.)  In 2001, the PCWA was finally 
replaced with the Ministry of Gender Equality (MOGE).34  MOGE further expanded the 
scope of women’s policy by addressing violence against women, child-bearing and caring, 
and women’s job-training programs. Additionally, in 2003, MOGE established the 
Korean Institute for Gender Equality Promotion and Education (GEPE) to provide “the 
models for gender equality education and gender sensitivity policy analysis 
training…focusing on public office holders” (GEPE 2003). 
34 This is the name used in English.  A word-for-word translation of the Korean name is 
Ministry of Women’s Affairs.  Both names are official.  In my personal memory, there 
ware serious debates about choosing between “women” and “gender” when naming the 
ministry that would replace the PCWA.  Some argued that internationally the term 
“gender” was more appropriate than “women,” but others worried that women would 
once again be marginalized if the term “gender” was used.  So finally, the Ministry of 
Gender Equality came to have two names; “gender” for use internationally and “women”
for Korean use. 
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C. Korean Women Today
Sixteen years after the establishment of the first national machinery, can we evaluate the 
results?  What is women’s status in Korea today?  Clearly, the Korean government has 
achieved some important and impressive progress in the area of women’s rights.  As we 
considered above, women’s national machineries, as well as the expansion of focal points 
including women’s branches in other ministries, have been developed and a number of 
laws and regulations aimed at women’s empowerment have been established or revised.35
Affirmative action for female applicants for government positions has been in place since 
1995; sexual segregation or prohibition against women in some areas such as the military 
academies and police recruitment have been abolished.36  Alongside these kinds of 
governmental measures, diverse social indicators also show rapid change and 
improvement in Korean women’s lives during this period: the ratio of girls’ entrance to 
college and university changed dramatically from 25.3 percent in 1970 to 72.1 percent in 
2002—a figure that is almost the same as boys’ (75.1 percent); the average life 
expectancy of women rose from 66.7 years to 80.0; and the percentage of female 
employees to total female workers (i.e. not including family-owned farm women, shop 
keepers, etc.) from 28.6 to 63.5 during the same period (National Statistical Office 2003). 
At the same time, Korea is setting a new world record in its declining reproduction
35 The UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women evaluated
highly the establishment of Korea’s national machinery and the new laws mentioned 
above at the third and fourth deliberative council in 1998 (PCWA 1998). This Committee 
has authority to review each country’s national report submitted every four years based 
on the eighteenth paragraph of CEDAW. 
36 Male and female separate recruiting of police and firefighters was abolished in 1989, 
and as a result, the female ratio was improved in that area. Military academies had 
prohibited female students from entering until 1997.  Interestingly, in spite of 
conservative people’s concerns, the ice-breaking entering students’ scholastic attainments 
were excellent and one of them graduated as a first-honored grade. 
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rate and increasing divorce rate. In 2002, the Korean reproduction rate was 1.16, the 
very lowest in the world; the divorce rate was 3.0 (3 cases among 1,000 people), ranking 
second highest in the world.37  Whether these rates are to be considered positive or 
negative, there can be no doubt that they signal the collapse of Korea’s “traditional”
family structure.  Some national policymakers have connected this situation with 
women’s increasing labor participation rate:38 from 37.0 percent in 1963, 39.3 percent in 
1970, 42.8 percent in 1980, to 49.8 percent in 1997.  However, in 1997, the Korean 
female labor market participation rate stopped increasing, and in 1998 and 1999, even 
declined to 47.1 percent and 47.6 percent, before rising again to 49.7 percent in 2002.
The decline in 1998 and 1999 may have been due to the Korean monetary crisis and 
subsequent economic “structural adjustment” policies required by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF); male participation rates also dropped in these years and the 
overall unemployment rate was higher than for other years: 7.0 percent in 1998, 6.3 
percent in 1999, compared to 3.1 percent in 2002 (NSO 2003-a, b). 
Although the increase in women’s labor force participation rates is impressive, 
these figures still lag considerably behind the rates for men: 74.8 percent versus 49.7 
percent (2002).  According to a 2003 Opinion Survey, 38.3 percent named “the burden 
of child care” the primary obstruction to female employment; 22.8 percent named “social 
prejudice”; 12.4 percent named “unequal working conditions”; 8.9 percent named 
37 Correctly speaking, this rank is among Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries, but can be interpreted as “in the world,” because OECD 
countries generally have the highest divorce rates in the world.  According to Korean 
National Statistical Office’s 2002 report, the U.S. is ranked first at 4.0, with Britain and 
Australia following Korea at 2.6. (National Statistical Office [NSO] 2003-c). 
38 It is a typically conservative point of view to connect women’s participation in the
paid workforce with a so-called family crisis; one example would be the debate over 
whether women’s paid work results in “children’s behavior problems” (Cooksey et al. 
1997).
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“burden of housework”; 6.3 percent named “lack of responsibility”; 2.3 percent named 
“lack of ability” (NSO 2003-d).  
The change in family structure should not be explained simply as the result of the 
increasing number of women in the paid labor force.  In fact, according to the 
Engelhardt and Prskawelz's demographic analysis of OECD member countries for a 30-
year period (2002), reproductive rates and female labor participation (FLP) rates do not 
necessarily correlate as might be expected (i.e., an increasing FLP along with declining 
fertility).  Their example is the comparison between Sweden, the country with the 
highest FLP rate and Italy, the lowest among the OECD countries.39 As shown in figure 
1, although Italy's female labor participation rate is low, Italy's reproduction rate is also 
low (47 percent FLP and 1.2 per 1,000 total fertility rate [TFR] in 1995); in contrast, in 
Sweden, where the FLP rate is high, the reproduction rate is significantly higher than 
Italy's (78 percent FLP rate and 1.75 TFR in 1995). The correlation for other countries is 
similar.  The correlation for other countries is similar. Moreover, according to the 2002 
39 Figure 1: Total fertility rate (TFR) and female labor force participation (FLP) rate in 
Italy and Sweden, in 1965 and 1995 (Engelhardt and Prskawelz 2002, 3).
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Human Development Report of UNDP, Korea ranks sixty-first in the Gender 
Empowerment Measure (GEM) among a total sixty-six countries.  GEM consists of four 
factors: the percentage of women in parliament; the percentage of female administrators 
and managers; the percentage of women among professors and technical workers; and 
women’s relative Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  The most important reason for 
Korean women’s poor showing in GEM ranks seems to have resulted from the low 
number of women legislators.  According to 2003 political statistics, women legislators 
at both national and regional levels is just 5.5 percent.  The percentage of professional
workers among female employees is 15.2 percent; high-level female government officials 
are just 2.7 percent, although women represent 32.9 percent of total government
employees.   
When compared to the Human Development Index (HDI),40 in which Korea ranks 
twenty-seventh, the GEM ranking must be viewed as very disappointing.  Even though
Bardhan and Klasen (1999) raised some criticisms of UNDP’s gender- related indices, 
claiming that the GEM focuses too heavily on representation at the national political level 
and on the formal economy, this result can be roughly interpreted to say that Korea lags 
in terms of gender equality, or women’s empowerment, especially when compared to its 
relative progress in the human development arena (Jo 2002). In considering an agenda 
for the Korean women’s movement, it will be important to keep in mind the continuing 
lag in Korean women’s relative status in spite of the many programs established by the 
Korean government. 
40 HDI consists of educational degree, life expectation, Gross National Product (GNP). 
42
D. An Agenda for Korean Women’s Empowerment 
1. Gender Mainstreaming and Institutionalization
“Gender mainstreaming” is one of the most emphasized catchphrases heard from MOGE 
officials.  It is this strategy that has extended gender concerns into the very institutions 
of the state.  This process of gender mainstreaming or “gender institutionalization” has 
resulted in a new discourse concerning women and the state.  Two quite different 
feminist perspectives have emerged.  One considers the patriarchal nature of the state 
(Staudt 1997); the other views the state as a neutral body that can provide proper 
measures to improve women’s status (Hae-suk Lee 2003).  While the former perspective 
is found in British and U.S studies, the latter, according to Kyung-hee Kim, is the 
perspective held by feminists in northern European welfare states.  Kyung-hee Kim 
(2003) identifies as one of the most important characteristics of the Korean women’s 
movement that many women’s activists and feminist researchers have served in 
government and/or political parties.  As a result, the relationships between academics, 
government policy makers, and feminist activists are quite close and many Korean 
feminists have adopted the northern European perspective (Kyung-hee Kim 2003; Hae-
suk Lee 2003).  
        To date, Korean national machinery has been most effective in employment 
related legislation and expanding education opportunities for girls and women, but less 
successful in increasing women’s political power.41  Sunwook Kim (2000) recognizes 
41 Seung-kyung Kim, in “Gender Policy and the New Status of Women in South Korea”
(2003) pointed out: “The South Korean government’s gender policy has focused on three 
areas: Equality between women and men; expansion of women’s participation in society; 
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this, writing : “There is no means by which a gender egalitarianism can enter policy 
design and decision making processes at the governmental level without the participation 
of women in both politics and those policy process” (68).  Several countries (e.g. France, 
Uganda) have overcome the obstacles to women’s electablity by instituting quotas or set 
aside seats in municipal regional, and national legislative branches.  I suggest that 
MOGE undertake a study of the feasibility of a similar policy in Korea.42
2. The Role of NGOs and Grassroots Pressure
McBride Stetson and Amy Mazur (1995), on the basis of fourteen case studies of 
women's policy machinery in the developed world, warn that the usefulness of so-called 
state feminism requires a balance between lobbying from moderate feminist groups and 
grassroots pressure from radical feminists outside the state; societies that favor strong 
state intervention; and an agency structure that promotes or requires interministerial 
cooperation.  We would be well-advised to consider whether these conditions exist in 
Korea before placing our hopes for women’s empowerment in state feminism. 
In the Korean context, the inclusion of activists and feminist researchers in the 
state can be expected to contribute to progressive legislative measures and policies for 
women, but only if “lobbying from moderate feminist groups and grassroots pressure 
from radical feminists outside the state” is heightened.  If not, the results could be the 
“ghettoization of feminism” (Nam 2000).  In short, becoming a “part” of the “system” 
and improvement of women’s welfare.  In addition to overall policy changes, women’s 
legal status has been subject to gradual transformation. Related to these three areas of 
focus, the government has enacted and revised various laws relevant to women” (216). 
42 In “Current Issues of the MOGE (2003)” the possibility of this study has been 
recognized: “the Ministry [of Gender Equality] has suggested that the Government take 
affirmative actions.  Specially, the government will regulate a minimum ratio of women 
in several sectors: women member of Parliament (10%)…” (7).
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can result in losing the capacity to stay critical of the system.  Similarly, Abeysekera 
(2003), referring to the experiences of “women who worked closely with leftwing 
political parties, groups and trade unions in the 1970s,” pointed to the dilemmas of 
“becoming a part,” especially with regard to maintaining a gender-specific analysis of 
issues and even claiming equal space and opportunities within the group. 
To solve this dilemma, Korean feminists need to keep in mind society as a whole, 
and not focus solely on governmental bodies.  The successes that the Korean women’s 
movement has had in the area of legislation and building national machineries are 
impressive; but there remains the reality of a still low female labor participation rate, job 
segregation and stereotypes that deprecate women’s roles and confine women within the 
family.  Oakla Cho, in a paper presented at the Modernity/Globalization and Women in 
East Asia Conference in 2000, emphasized that legal reforms have not been sufficient for 
women’s equality and called for “more vigorous cultural reform” (30, 33).  National 
machinery can be helpful in this area, for example by examining school textbooks for 
their representation of negative female stereotypes.  But to challenge patriarchy in 
culture and society, the role of women’s groups is especially important.  One area that 
should be addressed is the lack of awareness among women themselves of the rights to, 
and benefits of, increased equality in the workplace and the family (See Oakla Cho, 30).  
Women’s groups should increase their activities to raise awareness of women’s 
oppression.  For example, discussion of family and sexual equality would be best 
addressed by women’s groups.  Grassroots pressure on mass media (magazines, 
newspapers, film, and especially television) to represent women as active in public life 
and in all kinds of employment could also lead to cultural reform challenging patriarchal 
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ideology.  
In short, gender mainstreaming and institutionalization can be one of the 
strategies for advancing women’s status, but must be pursued along with grassroots 
activism and independent research if offices on women’s affairs within government 
agencies are to provide more than “token” victories.  Reviewing the opinion survey 
about the obstructions of women’s paid work participation, women need realistic 
supports to lighten their child care burden and cultural reforms that would cast away 
social prejudice.  To do this, we have to consider both “becoming part” and “staying 
outside,” if we are to empower ourselves. 
3. Increasing the Role of Korean Feminists in the International Arena
From 1975, when the Korean delegation to the first UN World Conference on Women 
consisted of five people without including any government official, the size and official 
status of the Korean delegation improved rapidly.  Whereas at the first conference the 
Korean delegation consisted of three professors, one activist, and one researcher, at the 
second conference, a government official, the director of the Women and Children 
Department in the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW), was included, although the 
delegation still included mostly professors (6) plus one activist (MHW 1982).  But 
beginning with the Nairobi conference, the head of the Korean delegation has been a 
government official.  At the Nairobi conference, the head of the Korean delegation was 
Hyun-Jeong Kim, the president of KWDI.  After this, the ministers of MPA II, PCWA, 
or MOGE have been appointed heads of delegations. 
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        1n 1993, Korea became a member of United Nations Commission on the Status 
of Women, and in 1996, Young-jung Kim, ex-minister of the MPA II, and ex-president of 
the KWDI, was elected a member of the United Nations Committee to Eliminate 
Discrimination against Women.43  In the 2000 Beijing+5 Conference, the Korean 
delegation started to participate in JUSCANZ44 and then played an important role in 
negotiations between JUSCANZ and the G77.45
In the Korean official report of its participation in the Beijing+5 conference, the 
debate on the family was mentioned as the main area where Korean delegates contributed 
to the negotiation between the two groups (PCWA 2000).  This role should be continued 
in future international meetings.  In 1995 and 2000, the core of the debate on the 
“family” focused on sexual orientation, because this was related to whether society 
accepts diverse family structures, including gay and lesbian couples’ marriages.  Korean 
delegates can expand this debate into other areas, for example, how to provide single 
mothers with support, and how to value women’s invisible labor in the family.  
Korean participation in NGO forums also expanded over the course of the UN 
conferences.  In 1995, for the Beijing conference, more than seven hundred women and 
men participated in the Korean NGO Committee.  And women’s NGOs are now 
participating in other international networks.  The East Asian Women’s Forum is an 
43 Based on the seventeenth paragraph of the CEDAW, it is composed of 23 experts, 
coming from member countries. The duration of committee service is four years.  
Experts screen and evaluate national reports which are about the implementation of the 
CEDAW, submitted by member countries every four years.  
44 The JUSCANZ group consists of Pacific Rim countries, Japan, United States, Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand.  This group has close economic relationships with each 
other, and common interests such as the environment, immigration policy, etc. 
45 G77 is the group of developing countries from the South and Middle East, formed at 
the first conference in Mexico City.  It consists of 123 countries. 
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example.  This Forum was developed at the Asia-Pacific Regional Conference in 1993 
in preparation for the Beijing conference, but still continues to monitor the region’s 
common concerns. The East Asian Women’s Forum consists of seven countries: China, 
Hong Kong, Japan, Macau, Mongolia, South Korea, Taiwan.  Bong-Scuk Sohn (1996) 
explains that the women from East Asia, who gathered at the Asia-Pacific Regional 
Conference, felt that they are largely neglected in UN conferences.  She asserts that one 
of the main reasons for this is the language barrier. Hyun Ja Kim (1996) adds that this 
group share a common cultural background and similar concerns, identifying the dynamic 
economic progress of their countries, a tradition of Confucianism, and a common 
tradition of high regard for scholarship and education. 
Women’s NGOs are also key players in efforts to promote Korean unification.  
Although there has been no war between South and North since 1953, tension and 
conflicts between the two are always present.  Women's participation in peace groups 
has been an important focus of Korean NGOs, paralleling the peace actions supported at 
Nairobi and Beijing and addressed in the Beijing Platform for Action in the stipulation 
that governments "increase the participation of women in conflict resolution at decision-
making levels."  The Platform for Action urges governments, as well as international 
and regional institutions, to integrate gender perspectives in the resolution of armed or 
other conflicts and foreign occupation.  Therefore, in the Korean situation, women’s 
peacemaking movements should be emphasized. 
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Beijing Conference Report announced, “The organized women’s movement initiated 
in the nineteenth century has become a global force” (UN 1995, paragraph 66).  In spite 
of the major drawback that the UN system has no mechanism to enforce its agreements, 
women have achieved several “declarations” that have functioned as an important ground 
for making claims on their governments.  They also gained significant experience as 
global agents.  Through these four conferences, the women’s movement achieved 
solidarity across differences, and at the same time opened up the possibility that the 
transnational/global feminist movement could transcend the pitfalls of both cultural 
relativism and universalism.  The women’s movement evolved in practice as well as in 
the area of epistemology.  At the Beijing conference, there even emerged a strategy to 
overcome the structural constraints placed on UN declarations.  Each country attending 
the conference would present specific national commitments to be achieved by the year 
2000.  This meant that the Beijing conference went beyond the limitation of “soft law” 
(Hopkins 1996), and convinced each country to implement a set of actions for women’s 
empowerment.  
The effects of these commitments have been different in each country.  The 
Korean government seems to have been particularly responsive in following the evolving 
international consensus.  Not insignificant in the government’s positive response, was 
the pressure women’s groups put on the government, both by participating in the state 
machinery and by monitoring government commitments.  National machineries of 
women’s policy were established and gender mainstreaming and institutionalization 
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emerged as a new strategy to implement women’s policy.  
There is now an important debate among Korean feminists over gender 
institutionalization.  Some think of this trend as the most efficient way to achieve gender 
equality in Korea, but others are concerned whether this will result in weakening NGOs’ 
power in relation to the state.  Looking at the contradiction between rapid economic 
development in Korea and women’s relatively stagnant overall status, I would like to 
suggest that pursuing gender mainstreaming and institutionalization should run parallel 
with women’s empowerment by and for themselves.  Without women’s self 
empowerment, gender institutionalization may result in mere “tokenism,” with some 
women advancing in public life, but with most women left behind. 
My research has been confined to a focus on the relationship between the UN 
conferences and the Korean government’s response.  Many other factors, such as the 
intrinsic power of the Korean women’s movement, and the historical background of 
Korean women would figure in a more complete investigation into women’s progress.  
But these UN conferences were certainly crucial, especially for providing the government 
with useful strategies and connecting Korean feminists to a global movement where 
common interests can be discussed and differences can be understood.  
This approach, viewing practical issues along with theoretical background, can 
help us design policies with greater insight into their implications.  At the same time, the 
chance to review how theoretical debates have influenced practices makes feminist 
discourse more concrete, and reminds us that we must keep foremost in our minds that
the purpose of our scholarship is to improve the conditions of women’s lives. 
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[Table 1] 
UN World Conferences on Women
Year Site Participants Results Forum
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Platform for Action NGO Forum
30,000 participants
2000 New York, U.S. 
6/5 – 6/10
180 Member States
(23rd UN General 
Assembly Special 
Session)
Further Action and Initiatives to 
Implement the Beijing Declaration 
and Platform for Action 





The Korean National Machinery and Laws on Women
Conference Korea National Machinery/Public Institutions Significant Legislation
1975
Mexico City




Korean Women’s Development Institute 
(KWDI)





Ministry of Political Affairs II 
(MPA II)
1987 
Guidelines to Eliminate Gender Discrimination
Equal Employment Opportunity Act 




The Presidential Commission for Women’s 
Affairs (PCWA)
1995
The Framework Act on Women’s Development
Ten Tasks for Women’s Social Participation
1997
The Act to Prevent Family Violence
The Act to Prevent Sexual Violence (revised)
2000
New York
2001 :Ministry of Gender Equality (MOGE) 
2003 : The Korean Institution for Gender 
Equality Promotion and Training(GEPT)
2000
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